



PJM Capacity Market Workshop Session #3:

Forward Clean Energy Market

Neal A. Fitch


Senior Director, Regulatory Affairs, NRG

Neal.Fitch@nrg.com

March 12, 2021

- 30 states have a binding renewable portfolio standard that legally oblige (some part of) the power business to (buy or sell) a certain percentage of their electricity from qualifying, usually zero-carbon resources.
 - In PJM, 11 of the 14 jurisdictions and many cities/municipalities have set goals or standards
- We observe that goals are accelerating in many regions
- In-state preferences and technology carve-outs have resulted in an increasingly inefficient patchwork of policies

Where are our efforts focused in today's discussion?



A Market-Based Model: Forward Clean Energy Market



- This concept grew out of the ISO-NE's "Integrating Markets & Public Policy" (IMAPP) process
- Adapted and further defined by Brattle Group for NRG
- Evolution and variations continue with ICCM
- A good idea whose time has come?



<https://www.brattle.com/news-and-knowledge/publications/how-states-cities-and-customers-can-harness-competitive-markets-to-meet-ambitious-carbon-goals-through-a-forward-market-for-clean-energy-attributes-expanded-report>

- A Forward Clean Energy Market is a trade in Clean Energy Attribute Credits (“CEAC”)
 - 3-year forward annual auction
 - Uniform product definition where 1 unit = 1 MWh of production of clean energy
 - Can be enhanced by making them “dynamic,” tied to the marginal emissions prevailing during the time of a CEAC’s creation
- Demand bid expressed by a volume-and-price bid, anchored around:
 - the state’s clean-energy procurement requirement and
 - the state’s reference price
 - *e.g.*, social cost of carbon or a legislative price cap, *etc.*
- Multiple states’ participation + voluntary actors (cities & customers) allow for the market to scale up.

- RTO-operated, state demand-determined design can...
 - Address existing conflict among state goals and wholesale markets
 - Achieve and exceed state goals
 - Maintain compatibility among jurisdictional matters
- Direct line of sight to new clean energy investment to meet statutory goals
 - Achieve faster and cheaper decarbonization than alternatives through sloped demand curve + banking provisions prior to binding compliance requirement
- Less risk for consumers vs. long-term, *ad hoc* contracting

- Strength in numbers – distribution of risk to many buyers/sellers; avoids lumpiness.
 - State policies less dependent on individual project non-performance; projects not as subject to counterparty bankruptcy
 - Easier platform for smaller buyers (*e.g.*, munis and/or corporations) from which to buy
- A more level playing field between existing and new resources who provide the same product (*e.g.*, zero-carbon energy)
- Sends a stronger signal to developers to site projects where energy & capacity are most valuable


Questions?



Appendix




- An annual auction, 3 years forward
 - Spot auction before compliance period to allow trade for residuals
 - Banking permitted to encourage early adoption/smooth pricing/project formation
 - Borrows from (and complementary with) existing capacity auctions



Source: Spees, *et al.* "How States, Cities, and Customers Can Harness Competitive Markets to Meet Ambitious Carbon Goals." September 2019.


- 7-year "price lock" for new resources

- Different buyers all have a different willingness to pay.
- A central market accommodates these and ensures that those willing to pay more are not simply paying more for less—but *getting more* because of that willingness to pay.



Source: Spees, *et al.* "How States, Cities, and Customers Can Harness Competitive Markets to Meet Ambitious Carbon Goals." September 2019.


Illustrative sloped demand curve & reference price



Year	Social Cost of Carbon (\$/ton)
2020	\$47.25
2025	\$51.75
2030	\$56.25
2035	\$61.87
2040	\$67.49
2045	\$71.99
2050	\$77.62


Source: Spees, *et al.* "How States, Cities, and Customers Can Harness Competitive Markets to Meet Ambitious Carbon Goals." September 2019.

Source: Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon (updated 2016, revd for 2019 real dollars).



Source: Spees, *et al.* "How States, Cities, and Customers Can Harness Competitive Markets to Meet Ambitious Carbon Goals." September 2019.

One (complicating but positive) enhancement



Source: Spees, *et al.* "How States, Cities, and Customers Can Harness Competitive Markets to Meet Ambitious Carbon Goals." September 2019.