

FTR/ARR Funding and Education


FTRSTF

June 25, 2014

Planning Period	Revenue Adequacy
2007-08	100%
2008-09	100%
2009-10	97%
2010-11	85%
2011-12	81%
2012-13	66%
2013-14	72%


2013/2014 Revenue Inadequacy Assignments (\$millions)

- Balancing Congestion
- Day-Ahead Inadequacies



2013/2014 Detailed Revenue Inadequacy Assignments (\$millions)


- Stage 1A Infeasible Rights
- Transmission Outages (FTR vs. Day-Ahead differences)
- M2M constraints Including M2M Payments
- Uncontrollable Inadequacy (Forced Outages, Real-Time Switching, Polar Vortex, Demand Response, Volatage/Thermal Surrogates/NERC Derates)
- Transmission Outages (Day-ahead vs. Real-Time differences)




Stage 1A Allocation – Infeasible facilities

- Quantity of Infeasible facilities have increased over last several years
 - Increased Transmission Outages
 - Increased uncompensated power flow (i.e. Loop Flow)
 - Additional M2M Flowgates

PJM ARR Stage 1A Infeasible Facilities



PJM ARR Stage 1A Infeasible Facilities and Causes



Planning Period	Congestion Credits (\$millions)	Total FTR Revenue Inadequacy (\$ millions)	FTR Revenue Adequacy %	FTR Revenue Inadequacy from Stage 1A Infeasible ARR (\$ millions)	Stage 1A Infeasible ARRs % of FTR Revenue Inadequacy
2012/2013	\$623	\$288	68%	\$75.3	26%
2013/2014	\$1,819	\$691	72%	\$199.7	29%


FTR revenue shortfall from Stage 1A infeasible facilities continues to increase

- Inadequacy of Stage 1A ARRs calculated as follows:
 - Value the MWs of infeasible Stage 1A ARRs utilizing the day-ahead congestion prices (MW * (DA Sink LMP – DA Source LMP)*hours in period)
 - Day-ahead congestion LMPs used because the MWs of infeasible ARRs translates into additional FTR MW capability available in FTR auctions as either Self Scheduled FTRs or purchased FTRs.
 - PJM can “buy back” capability on infeasible facilities by utilizing excessive auction revenue but this is difficult and only moves the risk of inadequacy into the FTR auctions as reduced revenues.

Stage 1A Over allocated Inadequacy Distribution


2012/2013

- Network Load (Internal and M2M Flowgate)
- Network Load (M2M Flowgate)
- Transmission Outages




2013/2014

- Network Load (Internal and M2M Flowgate)
- Network Load (M2M Flowgate)
- Transmission Outages



	2012/2013	2013/2014
Network Load (Internal and M2M Flowgate)	\$52.3	\$107.0
Network Load (M2M Flowgate)	\$22.6	\$63.5
Transmission Outages	\$0.4	\$29.2
Total	\$75.3	\$199.7

Annual ARR Credits and Modeled Outages




	2012/2013	2013/2014	2014/2015
■ Annual Outages Modeled	36	145	199
■ ARR Credits (\$ millions)	\$560	\$504	\$711

Stage 1 Allocation – Historical Resources

Generation Retirements

- Requires remapping historical resources to an equivalent generator or creating a dummy generator for ARR/pricing purposes only
 - Idea was to preserve the historical transmission system rights
 - May create additional Stage 1A infeasibilities
- Substantial amount of retirements not expected when Stage 1A process originally designed.

Historical Generation Retirements



15.4% of Stage 1 historical generation has retired or submitted deactivation notices representing 25,543.7 MWs

Possible Stage 1 changes

1. Allow proration in Stage 1A
 - Improves FTR funding by removing infeasibilities
 - Improves confidence in FTR values
 - Minimal impact on ARR revenues
 - More constrained ARR/FTR facilities usually increases ARR credits (i.e. 2014/2015 ARR credits higher although less ARRs cleared)
 - Revenue Adequacy should improve and provide confidence to FTR bidders to not devalue bids
 - Stage 1A 10-Year process still exists
2. Remove Stage 1 historical resources when they physically retire
 - Units do not exist so transmission system rights from generator not necessary
 - Should reduce stage 1A infeasibilities
 - Creates correct model